Abstract Requirements determination (RD) during information systems delivery (ISD) is a complex organiza-
Introduction and Motivation
Identifying and agreeing on the requirements for a new information technology (IT) application are two of the most difficult tasks in the information systems delivery (iSD) process. Requirements determination (RD) is characterized by ongoing sensemaking among stakeholders, and it can be chaotic, nonlinear, and continuous (Banseler and B0dker 1993; Curtis et al. 1988; Walz et al. 1993) . Not only are there multiple stakeholders whose various ways of understanding requirements must be taken into account and reconciled, but their ideas may change, particularly in iong-term projects or if business conditions and key stakeholders change. We often hear laments about scope creep, project drift, or requirements becoming a moving target. Given these organizational realities, a reasonable goal might be to attempt to arrive at provisional agreements so that something useful could be built and implemented. However, even such a pragmatic goal can be difficult to achieve.
Researchers have examined a number of social, cognitive, and political processes in iSD that influence RD activities and outcomes. A theoretical approach that focuses on sensemaking processes is helpful for investigating why participants in such activities understand requirements as they do (Dougherty 1992 ) and why their understanding of requirements may change and shift (El Sawy and Pauchant 1988) . Orlikowski and Gash (1994) developed the concept of technological frames of reference as an analytic lens for examining how stakeholders' socio-cognitive interpretations influence their actions related to IT development and use in organizations. This research draws on the technology frames concept to develop a process model of how frames and frame shifts influence sensemaking during requirements determination and applies this model in the analysis of an ISD project. The framing model provides a theoretical and conceptual perspective that deepens our understanding of requirements processes in organizations and ofthe socio-cognitive basis of power and influence in iSD.
In the next section, a review of the theoretical foundations for this work in the organizational literature on social cognition and its applications in IT research is presented. From this basis, the framing process model is outlined. The methodology section describes the longitudinal field study that provided the empirical basis for the research. Four technology frames were evident during RD activities in this project. The influence of these frames is traced through eight episodes in the project studied. This narrative examines contextual changes and events that triggered shifts in frame salience and the implications of these shifts for provisional agreements about requirements. Recurring shifts in frame salience resulted in repeated reinterpretations of requirements as the project unfolded. How the framing model and frame shifting patterns further our understanding of RD processes is then considered. The paper concludes with a discussion ofthe implications for research and practice.
Theoretical Foundations
Researchers have for some time been interested in how individuals cognitively process information and how their information processing affects behavior, decisions, and performance. Underlying this interest is the premise that reality is socially constructed through human beings' interpretations of experience and action and their social negotiation of meaning (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Weick 1979 ), Social cognitive research shares the fundamental tenet that an individual's knowledge about an informational domain is cognitively structured through experience and interaction. Findings suggest that these socio-cognitive knowledge structures provide templates for problem solving and evaluation, focus attention on information consistent with existing structures while masking inconsistent information, and fill information gaps with information that conforms with existing knowledge structures (Fiske and Taylor 1984; Markus and Zajonc 1985 ; for a comprehensive review of this literature, seeWaish 1995). Although cognition occurs at the individual level, researchers have posited the existence of group-level knowledge structures, that is, of shared knowledge and beliefs that function in a similar way as individual knowledge structures (Fiol 1994; Gioia et al. 1989; Porac et al. 1989; Walsh and Fahey1986) .
Socio-cognitive approaches have many applications in organizational and technology studies. Organizational researchers have been concerned with how individual and group knowledge struc-tures influence interpretation of meaning, action, and organizational outcomes, particularly related to strategic direction setting and organizational change (Bartunek 1984; Bartunek and Moch 1987; Fiol 1994; Kiesler and Sproull 1982; Lord and Foti 1986; Weick and Bougon 1986) . Others have addressed socio-cognitive processes underlying product development processes (Dougherty 1992; El Sawy and Pauchant 1988; Walsh et al. 1988) .
Social construction of technology researchers have investigated how knowledge shared by members of a social group (e.g., scientists, inventors, users, manufacturers) influences their development of artifacts and their understanding of a technology's properties and uses in a social context (Bijker 1995; Bijkeretal. 1987) .
IT researchers have similarly been concerned with socio-cognitive processes, positing that requirements for IT applications do not exist a priori but are socially constructed through interactions among ISD participants (Bansler and Bedker 1993; Curtis et al. 1988; Dagwell and Weber 1983; Malhotra et al. 1980; Newman and Nobel 1990; Walz et al, 1993) . In these interactions, the style of interaction and language use influences what requirements are Identified and legitimized (Boland 1978; Boland and Greenberg 1992; Davidson 1999; Mason 1991; Salaway 1987) , Of particular concern to researchers is how technical designers' assumptions dominate decisions about technology design and application (Boland 1979; Bostrom and Heinen; 1977; Dagwell and Weber 1983; Ginzberg 1981; Hirschheim 1986; Hirschheim and Klein 1989; Markus and Bjorn-Anderson 1987) . Such research complements and extends technology-based or methodological approaches by addressing social, learning, and negotiation processes in ISD.
Drawing from these areas of research, Orlikowski and Gash (1994) articulate a socio-cognitive perspective in IT research focused on the concept of technology frames of reference.^ They use the term frame to describe knowledge structures derived from a domain of knowledge and experience. Technology frames are "that subset of members' organizational frames that concern the assumptions, expectations, and knowledge they use to understand technology in organizations. This includes not only the nature and role of the technology itself, but the specific conditions, applications, and consequences of that technology in particular contexts" (p, 178) . In their study of the adoption of Lotus Notes software, they identified three frames that characterized technologists' and users' understanding and use of Notes: (1) nature of the technology, \.e.. understanding of its features and uses; (2) technology strategy, i.e., assumptions about management motivation for implementing technology and criteria for judging success of the IT; and (3) technology-in-use, i,e,, expectations about priorities and resources, training approaches, ease-of-use, and policies for security and quality.
The technology frames concept provides a useful analytic lens to Investigate how [SD participants come to understand requirements as they do and a starting point to investigate the circumstances that facilitate or constrain their maintaining provisional agreements about requirements. ISD participants draw on their technology frames to make sense of contextual information and to ascertain the implications for project requirements. That is, they interpret their organizational worlds to arrive at an understanding of requirements. In this process of interpretation, frames act as templates for problem solving as well as imprecise, conservative filters for new information. In team-based orgroupprojectwork, a diversity of group and individual technology frames provide an array of possible socio-cognitive filters for interpreting contextual information and making sense of possible requirements, Orlikowski and Gash 2 Orlikowski and Gash's formulation of the technology frames concept has similarities with Bijker's (1995) use of this term. His definition of elements of a technological frame (e,g,, goals, key problems, users' practices) overlap frame dimensions identified in their study (e.g,, technological strategy motivation, criteria for success, ease-of-use, training). Other elements mentioned by Bijker, such as tacit knowledge, are implicit in Orlikowski and Gash's definition. One substantive difference is that Bijker includes technology artifacts within his definition of a frame, whereas Orlikowski and Gash's frame concept is strictly socio-cognitive and does not include the technology artifact per se.
show that differences, or incongruence, in the frames of key stakeholder groups are a source of disruption in ISD. However, others have argued that socio-cognitive differences may facilitate diverse interpretations of information and thus improve group decision making in problem formulation activities (Fiol 1994; Walsh et al. 1988; Walsh 1995) .
To investigate turbulence and change in problemsetting activities (such as requirements determination), it can be instructive to consider sociocognitive effects such as frame shifting (El Sawy and Pauchant 1988) , Although frames, once formed, are resistant to change (Walsh 1995) , contextual changes can trigger shifts that bring new knowledge to the forefront of sensemaking (Bartunek 1984; Barr 1998; El Savifyand Pauchant 1988; Gioia 1986 ). El Sawy and Pauchant (1988) found that frame shifts can be abrupt and of short duration; nonetheless, these shifts in frame salience influence how participants make sense of environmental information at that point in time, and the decisions and actions they subsequently take. Changes that trigger a shift in salient technology frames could lead to reinterpretation of information and lead to new understandings of IT requirements.
Frame salience may also shift when participation in a project changes, Walsh etal, (1988) demonstrated that the frames of individuals who are highly influential are more heavily weighted in group decision-making tasks. Requirements determination is often driven by individuals such as executive champions, project leaders, or lead designers (Curtis et al, 1988; Heng et ai, 1999; Newman and Sabherwat 1996; Reich and Benbasat 1990; Walz etal, 1993) . The technology frames of such individuals can become the dominant filter that shapes how IT requirements are articulated and legitimated among ISD participants. If changes in participant power occur during ISD, as it often does (Robey and Newman 1996) , frames may likewise shift toward those of dominant participants, altering the basis on which interpretations are made by other participants. Socio-cognitive analysis can thus complement our understanding of power and influence in ISD (Brown 1998; Markus 1983; Robey et al. 1989; Siilince and Mouakket 1997) by drawing attention to the basis of power in stakeholders' interpretations and dominant cognitive influences (Markus and Bjorn-Anderson 1987) .
The socio-cognitive process model depicted in Figure 1 integrates the analytic concept of technology frames with these empirical and theoretical insights. Point (1) suggests the function of frames as attention-directing and problem-solving templates. Point (2) illustrates that frannes act as interpretive filters favoring cues that are consistent with an existing frame. Point (3) depicts the situation in which change triggers, such as a shift in business strategy or changes in stakeholder participation may lead to shifts in frame salience and, ultimately, new understandings or interpretations of project requirements.
This socio-cognitive model provides a theoretic basis and analytic lens with which to investigate turbulence in requirements determination. The framing model suggests that if ISD participants are to arrive at useful definitions of requirements, their frames must be sensitive to changing conditions that arise. At the same time, frames must be stable enough to buffer distracting cues, so that provisional agreements can be engendered and the ISD process can proceed. Instability in RD, such as participants' Inability to maintain provisional agreements about requirements, may indicate frequent frame shifts and a framing process gone awry. The next section describes the research design and methods for an in-depth case study in which this model is used to analyze the influence of frames and frame shifts in RD processes. Examining frame shifts helped explain how organizational change and shifting participation in the project influenced participants' understanding of project requirements and disrupted their provisional agreements.
Research Study and Methods •
The research study reported in this paper was conducted at Group Health Incorporated (GHI) (a
Technology Frames

Organizational
Context: Information cue about the organization, its environment, business activities and priorities, IT capabilities Change (2) /\ (3) triggers
Understanding of Requirements
In the framing process, (1) technology frames act as socio-cognitive filters to direct ICD participants" attention and (2) to filter contextual information inconsistent with existing frames. (3) Change triggers may shift frame salience, possibly leading to new understandings of requirements
Figure 1. Technology Frames and Framing in Requirements Determination
pseudonym), a health care insurance company in the eastern United States that offers a variety of health insurance products and services. At the time of this study, there were approximately 6,000 employees located at headquarters and In sales, customer service, and health care service locations. At one time the dominant insurer in its regional market {with over 70% market share), GHl was frequently characterized as bureaucratic and inefficienL Since the late 1980s, GHl has suffered intense competition, the result of market changes, the shift toward health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the United States and debates over the cost of health care and government's role in this market. GHl management reacted to these challenges by acquiring one HMO, building a second, enacting cost control and staff reduction measures, and hiring executives to focus on rebuilding market share (at a low of about 35 percent at the time of the study).
in the early 1990s, the IS department comprised about 10 percent of all GHl employees. An executive characterized the department as "a large utility," which was mainframe-based with disparate, ineffective transaction processing systems, dependent on vendors and purchased software, and with no coherent communications network In place. During the late 198O's, GHl had undertaken a major IS development initiative to replace out-of-date systems, spending over $100 million on the MiS Initiative project, but producing no workable systems. Along with other financial problems, this IS failure brought governmental scrutiny of GHI's financial situation. Asa result, in early 1992, GHl executives decided to outsource the entire IS operations and development functions to a vendor. Information Systems, Inc. (ISI). Except for a small internal staff of business analysts, IS personnel were transferred to ISI and projects related to the MIS initiative were scrapped. Over the next two years, transaction processing systems were converted to the ISI systems platform; this process was still underway during the field study.
The systems development project examined here, the Business Information System (BIS) project, began in 1992 with a requirements study, shortly after IS outsourcing was undertaken. According to project participants and early requirements documents, the project's purpose was to create a relational database of marketing data extracted from the new platform of subscriber enrollment and sales systems, and to provide a user-friendly interface for end-users to generate business analysis reports. Technical staff in the sales organization, working with systems developers in ISI, IS personnel at GHI, and external consultants, conducted requirements determination activities over the course of the 30 months examined here, RD had been underway for more than a year before the research project began in mid-1993; it continued throughout the field study and was still going on when the field study ended in mid-1994. Yin (1988) recommends case study research to investigate contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident, to study how and why questions, and when multiple sources of evidence are needed. Such was the nature ofthis research. Technology frames are expressed symbolically through language, visual images, metaphors, and stories (Orlikowski and Gash 1994) . Since individuals employ frames when they produce speech or written materials (Moch and Fields 1985) , frames should be evident in the organizational discourse related to IT requirements for a given project, in oral dialogue as well as written artifacts. This discourse occurs in a wide range of contexts; data on technology frames, requirements, and contextual events must be collected from these multiple sources and contextually anchored, A longitudinal case study design is desirable for observation and analysis of processes that change over time (Glicketal, 1990) , This research was conducted as an interpretive case study. In interpretive studies, the researcher assumes that reality is socially constructed through human sensemaking and interaction; a primary purpose of such research is to better understand the complexities of sensemaking within cultural and contextual situations, usually in naturalistic settings such as field studies (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991), These assumptions apply both to the phenomenon of interest and to the research process itself. That is, the researcher accepts that data available for research are the subjective meanings of humans subjects, and attempts to understand these meanings from the subject's perspective (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991) , In the present study, the research goal was to understand how ISD participants make sense and assign meanings in the social process of formulating IT requirements. Furthermore, interpretive researchers acknowledge that the data they obtain and the analysis they conduct are shaped by their own preconceptions and inquiry process (Walsham 1995, p, 376) , Thus, use of the technology frames concept in this research guided interpretation of study subjects' actions and of events in the BIS project.
Research Design
Explicitly examining assumptions and methods helps researchers reveal their interpretive processes to readers; a few comments are thus appropriate about the researcher rote in the study and about interactions with study subjects (Klein and Myers 1999) . Access to the research site was negotiated through a senior executive (Sam Brady), who suggested the project for study. Subsequent meetings were held with project personnel to ascertain their willingness to participate. Throughout the study, key informants were formally interviewed and informal discussions about project events were held. General feedback about research findings after the analysis was complete was promised. Because key informants left GHI shortly after the on-site phase of the research, a formal feedback session did not occur.
The Appendix reviews criteria for assessing the quality of interpretive field studies and assesses this study in more detail against those criteria. 
Data Collection and Analysis
Qualitative data collection methods were used to gather data from the written and oral discourse related to requirements, Intervievi's with project participants and potential users were one major source of data (see Table 1 ). informants were asked to reflect on the project's history as wel! as on current events at GHI and their implications for IT requirements. Interviews were audio taped and transcribed to preserve details of language use. During the time on-site (two or three days per week over 12 months), numerous informal discussions were held with project participants about activities and events at GHI, These conversations were recorded in field notes, typically after concluding the day's field work. Observational data were also collected in planning meetings, working sessions, presentations to management and users, and training sessions. Eight hours of team meetings were audio-taped; when audiotaping was not possible, detailed field notes were recorded.
The written discourse related to requirements in project artifacts such as systems documentation, transcriptions of analysts' interviews with users, project proposals, training materials, memos, and meeting notes were examined. From these various sources, data were collected on requirements determination activities covering approximately two and a half years of the BIS project (January, 1992 through July, 1994 .
A typical first step in social cognitive research is identifying frame domains (Walsh 1995) . Orlikow-ski and Gash (1994) caution that frames are timeand context-dependent and thus should be examined in situ, rather than be assumed a priori (p, 184), Through iterative reading of the data, use cf open coding techniques from grounded theory (Martin and Turner 1986; Strauss 1987) , and sorting and refining of data categories (Miles and Huberman 1994) , four analytic categories were developed that represented distinct frame domains evident in the discourse about IT requirements in the BIS project: IT delivery strategies, IT capabilities and design, business value of IT, and IT-enabled work practices. Each of these analytic categories represent a closely related set of assumptions, expectations, and knowledge, which BIS project participants drew on to interpret information and to articulate IT requirements. The four categories themselves represented an interrelated web of frames. For example, systems developers' expectations about the "plug and play" nature of client server technology {IT capabilities and design) related closely to their "building block," prototyping ISD approach {IT delivery strategies). Nonetheless, itwas useful analytically to consider frames individually, in order to observe how contextual cues and events triggered shifts in frame salience and to closely examine frame influences on BIS participants' understandings of requirements. Table 2 shows content characteristic of each frame's domain and examples of frame content specific to the BIS project. The four domains identified in this case have face validity, when we consider how requirements determination processes occur in organizations: we expect ISD participants to think about how to go about the development process, what information technologies to use, what the business justification and expected outcomes of the project are, and how a new IT will be applied in work processes and procedure. The four analytic categories identified here are not, however, an exhaustive list of all potential domains; in various study contexts, different domains may be evident. Three categories-IT capabilities and design, business value of IT. and IT-enabled work practices-are similar to domains identified by Orlikowski and Gash, respectively, nature of technology, technology strategy, and technology-in-use. The domain IT delivery strategies was highly salient in the BIS requirements determination project, but was not evident in Orlikowski and Gash's study, which focused on a post-system implementation period. Frame content, that is, the specific knowledge or assumptions articulated by informants, reflected the context of the project studied and the information technologies under development.
individual-level frames were assessed by examining and categorizing data from all sources related to key individuals.^ Close attention was given to informants' use of metaphors and figures of speech (Boland and Greenberg 1992; Davidson 1999; Lanzara 1983; Mason 1991; Moch and Fields 1985) and stories (Boje 1991; Dube and Robey 1999; Polanyi 1989) as symbolic indicators of their frames. To identify shared aspects of frames, data related to individuals in two critical social groups were compared. Systems developers were individuals whose major responsibilities included planning for, analyzing, developing, or supporting IT systems, regardless of their organizational title or position. System constituents were individuals who may have participated in ISD activities but whose main relationship to the BIS application was that of potential user. This grouping was consistent with Orlikowski and Gash's technologist/users groupings. For this case, it was necessary to also consider individual-level frames. The frames of powerful individuals such as Executive Vice President Sam Brady had a distinctive influence on how BIS requirements were understood, Brady did not fit organizationally into either group, and his frames were distinct from system constituents, developers, and other executives.
To organize findings and to facilitate longitudinal analysis, data about critical events, frame salience, and definitions (oral and written) of BIS requirements were chronologically ordered. Thiŝ
This method is consistent with Orlikowski and Gash and is suited to the multiple sources of data available for analysis in this project. Other approaches for frame representation such as cognitive mapping and multidimensional scaling are method-bound, and no one standard has emerged (Walsh 1995 
IT capabilities and desigri
• Generalized knowledge of and expectations about relational databases, graphical user interfaces, report generation software, client server architectures • Understanding of GHI's IT architecture, and how various "building blocks" fit together in the past, present, and future as "front-ends," "back-ends," and so on
Business value of IT
• Generalized assumptions and expectations about how IT can be used to influence the organization's relationship with and control over its external environment, including customers or competitors • Generalized assumptions and expectations about how IT can be used to improve internal operations, increase efficiency, reduce administration, and increase coordination • GHI-specific expectations about the value of IT in facets of the organizational context related to an ISD project
IT-enabled work practices
• Assumptions and expectations about how an IT application will fit into day-to-day work practices • Situated understanding of data sources available for work, including the quality and legitimacy of data sources provided through IT applications and their applicability analysis highlighted eight distinct RD episodes during the 30 months studied. Each episode was triggered by events such as Brady's various interventions in the project. Transition to a new episode was evident in changes in the project discourse, such as new metaphors or stories, and in participants' debate about requirements, which differed (at least initially) from previously articulated definitions. In one episode (#4), project participants undertook separate but parallel project paths, as will be described. Episodes 1,2, and 3 occurred in the 18 months prior to the field study and were closely associated with formal RD activities such as feasibility studies. The remaining five episodes occurred during the year on-site and emerged through ongoing project discussions, team meetings, and other project events.
files from 11 different transactional systems; because data came from multiple, inconsistent systems, MSIS data was inconsistent and unreliable. The outsourcing of IS and ensuing installation of ISI's operational systems provided an opportunity to upgrade the MSIS system to take advantage of this integrated systems infrastructure {ITcapabilities and design). To start the process, Flynn and Mark Smith, a GHI business analyst, interviewed users and produced a traditional requirements document for building a replacement MSIS which would utilize a relational database and reporting system. The project's objectives at this time, stated in the requirements document, were modest, focusing primarily on reducing sales personnel's administrative paperwork {IT-enabled work practices).
Findings and Analysis
The following project narrative traces requirements determination in BIS through eight framing episodes, Reoccurring shifts in frame salience triggered repeated reinterpretation of the BIS project and its requirements. This ongoing reframing hindered project participants' efforts to arrive at and to maintain agreements about requirements, preventing the project from moving forward to implementation. Frames are noted in italics to indicate their influence on perceptions and actions at a point in time. Table 1 lists pseudonyms for key participants who are quoted or referred to in the narrative. Table 3 provides a summary of episodes, triggering events, and salient frames to guide the reader through the BIS story.
Episode 1: Rewriting MSiS
The BIS project began in 1992 as a requirements study for a new marketing and sales information system (MSIS), Jane Flynn, a business systems analyst at GHI, described the existing MSIS as technologically obsolete and difficult to maintain or change, because it was built in an older fourth generation language (FOCUS) and used feeder A sales rep could get up in the morning, turn the PC on and dial into home plate, and while they're in taking a shower, their leads for the day would get downloaded to a file....They could upload time and expense reports, sales win/lost reports and call reports and stuff so that the sales management could get a clear understanding of how they were spending their time,,,.lt would be an all electronic office environment...that would allow us to essentially say, 'We are going The project focused on defining requirements for a new marketing and sales system to replace an existing system (MSiS).
• (JuneOctober, 1993) This pilot targeted providing notebook PCs and lead tracking software to a group of sales personnel. The project was defined as a quick hit which could later be incorporated into BIS.
• IT delivery strategy Episode 4(b): Developing a Throwaway System (June-September, 1993)
The project team concentrated on providing a "bare bones" relational data base to replace the MStS system but also add new member-level information.
• (September, 1993 -October. 1993 The project team deliberated the feasibility of building BIS as the entry point of information into transaction processing systems.
• Business value of IT * IT capabilities and design • IT delivery strategy Episode 6: Chunking BIS into Phase I/Phase II (October, 1993 -March, 1994 After examining the NBR project, the team defined Phase 1 of BIS to focus on replacing the MSIS system with the "bare bones" relational database, piloting software to tie together the notebook PCs, and scoping Phase II. Phase II was to make BIS the front-end driver by automating NBR functions and links to other systems.
• Business value of IT • IT capabilities and design • IT delivery strategy Episode 7: Reconsidering "The Big" (April, 1994 -June, 1994 The project team debated how to enfold the NBR project into BIS by the published NBR deadline of August 1. The team recommended a combined project, but CIO Foley directed them to implement NBR without BIS.
• IT delivery strategy Episode 8: Constructing an Umbrella of Quick Hits (July, 1994 and ongoing) After an IT planning process, the BIS project reappeared on the strategic projects list. The Marketing VP assigned as project sponsor organized a steering committee, which began reviewing ideas for quick hit solutions starting with providing notebook computers to all sales personnel.
• IT delivery strategy RD Activities/Change Triggers The consultants derived their authority and influence from Brady's endorsement. The influence of their frames was evident throughout the discourse related to the project. For example, they renamed BIS the "Strategic Business Information System" (SBIS) and entitled all documents and presentations "Leveraging Information for Strategic Marketing Advantage," They utilized their own analytic models, which emphasized strategic approaches for IT use, to structure interviews, to direct the project team's discussions, and to structure information about requirements. During an SBIS review session, consultants dismissed concerns about enrollment processes, which sales staff raised, insisting that these issues were accounted for in their analysis." Consultants then organized presentations to executives according to their sales value chain model and used the model to justify decisions about the scope for project requirements.
The consultants' requirements document incorporated earlier ideas about sales force automation
Enrollment processes refer to the administralive steps involved in signing up subscribers for the health care plan, including holding information sessions, adding or changing subscriber information, issuing identification cards, and so on. Employers typically offer employees a chance to change plans annually, during the enrollment period.
and replacing the MSIS system with a comprehensive information repository for strategic marketing data. ISI staff added a technical implementation plan to the proposal, outlining six alternative approaches for implementing local and wide area networks for the project, ranging in cost from $2 million to $7 million, to be implemented using client-server technology. In contrast to the emphasis on business value of IT by the consultants from Ideas, the ISI sections of the document focused on IT architectural issueselements of the/7" capab/7/f/es and des/gn domain. The outcome of this requirements episode was a loosely integrated proposal fora large-scale, longterm, custom-built software development project {IT delivery strategies).
Episode 4: impiementing a Quick Hit; Developing a Throwaway System
The BIS project changed course abruptly when the BIS team presented this proposal to Brady. Brady, citing the possibility that President Clinton's National Health Care Reform (NHCR) initiative, which was in the headlines daily at the time (mid-1993), might radically change GHI's market structure, complained about the project's long duration (two years or more) and high cost. His critical reaction to the proposal abruptly shifted developers' attention away from strategic uses of IT in marketing and toward approaches for deveioping IT applications quickly, at low cost, to address immediate needs. Analyst Mark Smith's comments Illustrated how developers' assumptions related to IT delivery strategies became highly salient following this meeting:
All I could think of was the MIS fiasco, which was a system they tried to implement and they lost like ten [sic] million dollars on it....And the other thing that we didn't think of,..health care reform. Why go spend seven million dollars on a new system or even a million dollars,..if GHI isn't going to be in the same business...in five years?
Following this meeting, references to national health care reform became part of the discourse, appearing in informal discussions, team meetings, presentations, and project documents as the rationale for focusing on short-term delivery strategies and on requirements that could be rapidly developed and implemented. The team's recall of the "MIS fiasco" further heightened the salience of their assumptions about IT delivery strategies. The MIS fiasco was a powerful symbol at GHI about the dangers of large-scale, longterm, in-house development projects. References to the story subsequently appeared in oral discourse as a rationale for the team's plan to limit the scope of requirements, as it did in Smith's explanation cited above. However, unlike the national health care reform issue, this emotionally charged story was not explicitly mentioned in written discourse such as memos or requirements documents.
Episode 4a: implementing a Quick Hit
With their new focus on short-term IT delivery strategies, ideas consultants and GHI team members revamped their requirements definition as two smaller development projects. The first, a "quick hit" to provide a few sales representatives with notebook computers and to "spark their interest in BIS," emerged to address sales force automation requirements, Leslie Thomas explained how this occurred:
It spawned, 1 believe, when we were reviewing with Sam on the, for the SBIS, a quick hit solution that we could get out there immediately,,,,So what we wanted to do was get a tool out there on the notebooks that would then interface with the ultimate system.
The quick hit metaphor appeared in the requirements discourse as the rationale for this pilot project, and the concept of quick hits-the antithesis of the MIS fiasco-occurred frequently in subsequent conversations, memos, and presentations. This metaphor incorporated aspects of all four frame domains: an IT delivery strategy based on using packaged software and limited project duration; a conception of integrated IT infrastructure built from discrete building blocks (IT capabilities and design); assumptions about the acceptability of addressing short-term needs rather than substantial business transformation (IT business value); and the expectation that new technology tools would readily integrate with sales activities (IT-enabled work practices) . As the project progressed, however, systems developers' use of the quick hit metaphor became most closely linked to assumptions about IT delivery strategy.
This pilot project was the one area of the BIS project that was Implemented, Twenty sales reps were given notebook PCs loaded with customer relationship management software (the ACT/ Access package). Jane Flynn and Mark Smith conducted half-day training sessions to introduce sales personnel to the software's functionality. After equipment distribution and initial training, Thomas, Flynn, and Smith considered this quick hit project successfully concluded and focused their attention elsewhere This RD episode did result in a delivered IT product, but planned outcomes were less apparent. Sales representatives, in interviews conducted several months later, stated that they had not integrated the customer relationship software into their day-to-day practices. Only one sales team was using the software at all; others had given the notebooks to administrative aides for word processing or were using them to prepare sales presentations, rather than tracking leads and contacts. Some sale representatives complained about limited training. Others noted that because their managers were not utilizing the reporting software, manual reporting was still required. Thus, their expectations that the notebooks would be time-saving tools were not met, as these representatives explained:
I guess my long term goal would be, ideally, if someone needs a report, not to have us actually even be involved with the report, as long as we were updating our data. I think the ideal was to free up our time so that we could sell, and I think we missed the boat by not giving the support people the availability to do some of the things that we have to do off the system. These expectations, drawn from their IT-enabled work practices frames, guided system constituents' limited appropriation of the technology; because use of the notebooks seemed more burdensome than beneficial for sales activity tracking, sales representatives made little use of them for this purpose. Among developers, the IT-enabled work practices frame was not salient, and developers gave little attention to support activities that may have facilitated users' assimilation of this new technology.
Episode 4(b): Developing a Throwaway System
Building a scaled-down marketing database and reporting system on a client-server platform to replace MStS was the second set of requirements that emerged when developers' assumptions related to IT delivery strategies became highly salient, Alan Thompson described how the concept of a throwaway solution entered the discourse at the critical meeting with Brady:
That option was defined by Sam Brady.... So what it brought to bear, to the forefront is that throwaway solutions were valid.
The term throwaway frequently appeared in conversations, presentations, and documents as an indicator of developers' assumptions that the BIS project should address immediate needs and develop a system quickly, without regard for providing a platform for future requirements or later expansion.^ The consultants' new requirements document articulated this point:
Simitartothequick hit metaphor, the throwaway system concept embedded assumptions from all four frame domains, but it predominantly symbolized developers' assumptions about systems delivery strategies.
An interim "bare bones" throwaway solution, that facilitates member level information and the discontinued use of MSIS, is wholly acceptable.
To arrive at the bare bones throwaway solution, developers eliminated eight of sixteen information categories from the requirements list, including categories related to strategic marketing information that Ideas consultants had emphasized in Episode 3.^ Thus, developers' definition of requirements narrowed as a result of this frame shift from business value oflTto IT delivery strategies.
ISI technical personnel were asked to estimate costs to design the throwaway BIS and to develop a work plan for the next phase. GHI and ISI had not yet worked out the details of their outsourcing arrangement for new systems development, and disagreements about scope, cost, and duration of the project arose. For Leslie Thomas, the throwaway BIS project was a smaller, simpler project than the strategic marketing repository (SBIS), which ISI personnel (in Episode 3) had estimated to be a multi-million dollar project, and which Brady had rejected. For Thomas, the throwaway system had limited scope that could be completed quickly at low cost:
The charter of this project is to replace the MSIS system with its current functionality, and some added things we've added on to it, but not much... replace it, in a new technology.
Thomas believed ISI analysts' estimates for development were excessive for the throwaway solution, and she attributed this to ISI management not understanding nor accepting the need for short-term, rapid application development and their lack of expertise with client-server technology (GHI-specific aspects of IT delivery strategieŝ Excluded categories included data to support market segmentation analysis; prioritizing profitable business; capturing competitoraccount information; disseminating GHI product and pricing information; capturing competitor product and service developments: customer service metrics: customer satisfaction survey results; sales representative historical information. frame). The project was stalemated as GHI and ISI managers addressed these issues.
Episode 5: Building a Front-End Driver
After weeks of stalemate, the BIS project took another turn at a meeting with Sam Brady, which Leslie Thomas scheduled to complain about ISI's approach to the BIS project and to seek Brady's pressure on ISI. Instead, Brady shocked project team members by ignoring issues with ISI and instead telling them to do a "sanity check" on their assumptions about where BIS would sit in the flow of transactional and reporting systems, to consider whether it would be feasible to make BIS the "front-end driver for enrollment systems" to support consumer-based marketing. As he later explained:
My thinking all along was that we needed to have a marketing repository, for not only prospects, but for clients...that allowed us to begin to understand the lifetime value of a customer....And when it didn't turn out to be in the solution, that's when I kind of intervened at the end.
Brady's front-end-driver metaphor related to his expectations for business value of IT. Brady believed maintaining data about past customers and even purchasing data about prospective customers might be feasible, allowing GHI to use IT to extend its relationship with customers throughout their lifetime. Brady often commented that he had been insured by GHI all his life, but with different employer group plans, and that "no one at GHI knows that; only I know that." His metaphor suggested that the role of the BIS application in GHI's system architecture would change from a back-end data repository and reporting system into a front-end transaction processing system for collecting this data.
BIS project developers (Thomas, Flynn, Smith, and Thompson) began meeting with staff members from GHI's newly acquired HMO subsidiary (Tony Foley, Mary Kelly, and Peter Deutch). because this iS team had experience with ctientserver technologies, to consider Brady's ideas. The group's nebulous understanding of Brady's front-end driver concept for BIS requirements was evident in their references to the intended system in the first meetings merely as "It" or "the Big" and in metaphors they used to characterize assumptions about requirements for the system. For example, Leslie Thomas introduced the metaphor of BIS as an order entry system at the first working session to highlight the critical nature of such a system: I think it's much larger that what we understand today. It's big. There are a lot of associated costs with what "It" encompasses, doing it, and doing it right. Twenty years ago, I worked on an order entry system,..and I know, it has the potential to bring a company to its knees.
In other discussions, team members tried out various metaphors to help them characterize Brady's ideas, as Mary Kelly did here (metaphors in italics):
I'm confused. Is this the front-end of an order-entry system or the driving force for reengineering the enrollment process?
Brady's intervention and his use of the front-end driver metaphor triggered a salienoe shift toward developers' IT capabilities and design frame. His influence on developers was evident in their debates about "What does Sam want?" When Thomas was asked how she reacted to Brady's redirection of the project, she commented:
I never sat down and asked him why he changed his mind but I'm not sure I would,...Sometimes you don't question. Tony Foley, who did not report to Brady, was mindful of Brady's authority but less inclined to accept his ideas without question. At the group's first working meeting, he commented:
Sam floats balloons. If someone doesn't poke a needle in them, they gain a life of their own.
In the first days of Episode 5, Brady's expectations about business value oflTand developers' assumptions related to IT capabilities and design guided developers' consideration of requirements, but Brady's expansive vision of BIS as a front-end driver for enrollment systems contradicted developers' assumptions related to short-term IT delivery strategies. Developers realized "the Big" system Brady envisioned would be large-scale, expensive, and risky. In the first meeting held to consider this idea, Leslie Thomas articulated the dangers of undertaking a major development initiative, drawing on the MIS fiasco story to emphasize the risks:
If we bit off too big a piece, we'd have, pardon my analogy, an MIS Fiasco, Part 2, here,,,.We won't go down the $100 million road again.
At the same meeting, Foley reemphasized the importance of staging IT development:
It's our job to implement.
We put together a plan, this is what we're going to do, we will deliver these things.,,,What are the building blocks, what are the systems we need today?
Developers' assumptions about IT delivery strategies thus remained highly salient as they tried to make sense of Brady's redirection of the project. They began to talk about "chunking" the project into "building blocks"-combining IT capabilities and design assumptions with their assumptions about small-scale IT delivery strategies. They soon reverted to their focus on replacing the existing MSIS system with an enhanced, back-end marketing data repository, leaving analysis of requirements for Brady's front-end driver to a future project phase. Although they included references to the front-end-driver concept in a subsequent project proposal, no further work was done to specify these aspects of BIS over the next 8 months.
During Episode 5, the role of the consultants from Ideas, and the influence of their frames related to business value of IT, also diminished as IT managers Tony Foley, Peter Deutch, and Mary Kelly began to participate in BIS and their frames for IT delivery strategies gained influence. When Ideas consultants' participation was terminated (largely to reduce costs), their analytic models, terminology, even their name for the project (Strategic BIS) dropped out of the discourse. Requirements studies they had produced were superceded by subsequent documents; only a iist of data elements and of MSIS system functions were carried fonward into future documents. Developers assumptions about IT delivery strategies even shifted slightly, as the consultants' term throwaway system was replaced by Foley's building blocks concept.
Episode 6: Chunking BIS into Phase I/Phase II
Before agreements about requirements stabilized, Brady learned a GHI quality improvement team was investigating how to streamline and standardize subscriber enrollment procedures. Ideas consultants had ruled enrollment-related issues out of scope in Episode 3, However, the seasonal enrollment effort just passed had been chaotic (hence the formation of the quality improvement team), and Brady now saw a connection between this quality initiative, the New Business and Renewal (NBR) project, and his front-end driver concept. Leslie Thomas speculated how Brady had come to this assumption, and why the project was taking yet another change in direction:
I think he was trying to get at, how do we fix the service problem through information technology... .And we did not misread it [earlier requirements]. We did not get misdirection. He just changed direction.
Brady directed Thomas to meet with the NBR project manager to consider how these IT projects should work together. Brady's intervention temporarily increased the salience of business value of IT, leading developers to consider including enrollment processes within the project scope. However, Brady's action also sustained developers' focus on IT delivery strategies, as they considered how to coordinate these two projects, and reinforced the salience of their assumptions related to staging ITfunctionality in building blocks leading to an integrated applications architecture (aspects oftheir/Tcapai)/W/es and des/gn frame). During a series of meetings, BIS and ISi developers, drawing on metaphors of buildingblocks, front-ends, and back-ends, debated how data would flow among system components and how development would be accomplished in a series of phased development steps. After several sessions, BIS systems developers concluded that NBR requirements were really part of "the Big" BIS project. They assumed that the quality team would continue with pilot efforts to streamline business processes, but that NBR system development should be delayed until and included with Phase II of BIS. Thus, BIS developers did not examine requirements for NBR in detail; the only requirements statement produced were high-level, schematic charts showing major data flows between system components, staged over a series of project phases leading to an integrated system ("the Big"), Having subsumed Brady's front-end driver requirements as well as NBR requirements into "the Big" Phase II, developers turned their attention to Phase I, the MSIS replacement, a project whose scope fit more comfortably with their assumptions about short-term IT delivery strategies. This view of BIS requirements was similar to that which had emerged in Episodes 1, 4b, and 5, and had been rejected by Brady. However, at the meeting in which developers reviewed their proposal with Brady, he gave them unofficial approval to proceed with implementation. Brady later conceded that the BIS team had not really addressed the business feasibility of his front-end driver concept but he was reconciled to accepting their proposal as a first step in the evolution toward the ITenabled sales culture he envisioned.
For several weeks, developers' understanding of BIS requirements stabilized as they began planning the design and implementation. Mary Kelly officially joined the team as technical project manager at this time. Drawing on her understanding of client-server architecture and "plug and play" technologies (aspects of IT capabilities and design) and her concerns about lack of clientserver experience among ISI developers (a GHIspecific aspect of IT delivery strategies), she began meeting with IT integration vendors to discuss options for purchased packages and for hiring contract programmers with client-server experience. At one meeting, a salesperson referred to the notebook computers distributed in Episode 4a as "islands of automation" that could be connected electronically with a centralized database on a client-server platform.
Kelly brought the islands of automation metaphor into team discussions and soon identified a new quick hit to electronically connect the notebook islands to a centralized data repository. The team subsequently integrated this proposal with the MSIS replacement proposal for Phase 1, depicting integration of the islands in diagrams of Phase I.
Episode 7: "The Big"
As developers continued with planning activities, events at GHI were taking place that destabilized the project: EVP Brady was reassigned to a newly formed subsidiary; Tony Foiey was promoted to CIO for all of GHI; Leslie Thomas's sales development unit was moved from the sales organization to the IS organization managed by Foley; Jeff Green, the Sales VP who was to be the BIS project sponsor, was reassigned to a nonsales function; other layoffs and reorganizations within the sales division were implemented. These organizational events had implications for how BIS project stakeholders viewed the project and its requirements. In Episodes 2 through 6, EVP Brady's frame related to business value of IT had a strong influence in the organizational discourse related to requirements. When Brady was reassigned and Tony Foley became CIO, Foley's influence over BIS grew while Brady's diminished. Foley's IT delivery strategies irame. epitomized by his oft-repeated phrase of focusing systems efforts where "it hurt the most," soon dominated requirements discussions.
Foley's growing influence, combined with the resurfacing ofthe NBR project, soon disrupted BIS participants' provisional agreement about requirements. Despite Brady's interest in integrating the BIS and NBR projects, system developers had ruled enrollment activities out of scope for Phase I of BIS in Episodes 5 and 6. However, a consultant's report, commissioned independently by the NBR project manager, promised substantial monetary benefits (more than those identified for Phase I/MSIS replacement) from addressing enrollment problems before the upcoming enrollment period. BIS developers debated how they could graft NBR requirements onto Phase I of BIS (rather than Phase II) to appropriate NBR benefits for their own project. The ISI technical project manager described what happened when BIS developers presented their proposal for merging projects to Foley:
Tony got up and said, "This is where we're really hurting." And he proceeded to draw out the...account renewal system [NBR]....So I've nicknamed this thing the "son of NBR"...it is not the NBR and BIS system as we know it.
Leslie Thomas, however, continued to view MSIS replacement and "the Big" of Phase II as the overriding project definition, and the team's efforts with NBR merely as a short-term solution:
What we're doing for NBR right now is a quick hit, got to get it in by August, and it potentially could be 75% throw-away... Then I'm seeing BIS coming up and...the terminology NBR will go away because it will be inherent in BIS.
At Foley's direction, BIS developers began to work on NBR requirements, and the BIS project was suspended. Over the next weeks, several team members, including Leslie Thomas, left GHI, and the BIS project appeared to be dead.
Episode 8. Constructing an Umbreila of Quick Hits
While the former BIS developers began implementing NBR requirements, Tony Foley instituted a company-wide IS planning effort to identify strategic initiatives and organize priorities with ISI, Out of this effort, the BIS project arose like a phoenix on the list of strategic initiatives. Foley related how this came about:
I went before the Strategic Technology Committee,,,! said, "BIS is a strategic project but I can't find anyone that wants it, so I am recommending you put it on hold," Well, luckily Sam and [the CEO] disagreed, "No, this is a strategic project, we will find you a sponsor."
The marketing vice president assigned as the new BIS sponsor began to lead the project in yet another direction. A steering committee composed of marketing, sales, administration, and IS personnel was formed. In her opening comments to this committee, the VP gave this charge:
This has been the project that was going to eat New York,,,,l don't want to sit for the next three, four, five months scoping out the big cloud. We need to get tools and solutions out.
Analysts Jane Flynn and Mark Smith, drawing on their/Tc/e//Ve/ys^rateg/esframes, began outlining small projects that might be undertaken independently but coordinated under the umbrella of the BIS project, beginning with a plan to supply all sales personnel with a notebook computer and a basic set of personal productivity software, that is, an extension of the quick hit of Episode 4a. This approach, focused on incremental productivity improvements by supplying IT tools {business vaiue of IT), was a far cry from Brady's various notions for creating a sales culture at GHI through IT use. In a final interview, Brady described the situation:
Some people don't understand what BIS is,..I don't think you could get a random 20 people in the company who will tell you the same story about what it is.
Thus, project participants appeared to be no closer to a stable agreement about BIS requirements than they had been when the project first took shape 30 months earlier.
Discussion: Frames and Framing in Requirements Determination
The BIS project presents classic elements of project failure: loss of a project champion, lack of effective user involvement and project direction, organizational restructuring that affected key participants' careers, and difficulties implementing an IS outsourcing arrangement. Singlyand jointly, these contextual circumstances contributed to delays and redirections of the project. Nonetheless, an extreme case such as BIS can be useful if it highlights phenomena of interest (Yin 1988) , as it does here with the socio-cognitive process of framing. The BIS case demonstrates how shifts in frame salience that occurred during RD activities destabilized ISD participants' understanding of the project and made it difficult to maintain an agreement about requirements long enough to deliver system functionality. Analysis of shifting frame influence also illustrates how power in ISD is evident in framing and how flux in organizational authority influences this socio-cognitive process.
One case study, particularly of an unsuccessful project, provides a limited basis for understanding the nature of frames and framing in requirements determination. Furthermore, in a complex project like BIS, there are a number of social processes that could be the subject of fruitful analysis; this interpretive study reflects the researcher's interest in socio-cognitive processes and her sense-making during the course of the research. The phenomena of interest, technology frames and their influence on ISD participants' understanding of requirements through framing episodes, are also subject to personal interpretive analysis, making replication of research findings difficult at best. The Appendix elaborates on criteria for assessing the quality and plausibility of this study. Notwithstanding these limitations, the BIS case does suggest interesting insights into the sociocognitive nature of RD activities in organizations.
The four frame domains (outlined in Table 2 ) guided participants' sensemaking during RD activities: their attention to and interpretation of contextual information, their understanding of the project definition, and their articulation and legltimization of specific requirements. Moreover, the influence of frames was dynamic; frames shifted into and out of salience through eight episodes, redirecting project participants' attention toward or away from contextual information and leading them to reinterpret the project definition. Two predominant patterns of shifting frame salience were evident in the BIS project: (1) increased salience of the business value of IT frame, leading to radical reconsideration of project requirements; and (2) increased salience of the IT delivery strategy frame, resulting in reversion to conservative definitions of requirements consistent with this frame. The tension between assumptions characteristic of these two frames and ongoing shifts in frame salience between them explain much of the instability in ISD participants' understanding and agreements about BIS requirements In Episodes 2, 5. and 6, EVP Brady's actions, stories, and metaphors introduced new assumptions about how IT could be used to energize sales processes at GHI; his interventions triggered increased salience of the business value of IT frame. As a result, systems developers' and (in Episode 2) constituents' understanding of potential uses of IT in sales processes broadened to include sales force automation, life cycie marketing, and streamlined enrollment processes in these various framing episodes. As CIO Foley commented, Brady "floated balloons," which developers accepted with few questions, because his ideas were compelling and authoritative. They conducted weeks of meetings to consider his ideas, delaying the project and adding to their own and users' confusion and disillusionment over lack of progress. This type of salience shift was temporary, however, and developers' expanded understanding of the project proved to be unstable, because Brady's broad visions implied a large-scale, risky ISD project, and this contradicted developers' assumptions about shortterm, low-risk approaches. Developers did not reject Brady's frame related to IT business value per se; in fact, they continued to espouse his ideas. They instead redirected their attention and efforts in ways that were consistent with their own frame for IT delivery strategies.
IT delivery strategies emergeti as a highly salient frame domain at the end of Episode 3, and arose intermittently throughout the remainder of the BIS project. This salience shift was initially triggered by Brady's concerns about impending healthcare reform legislation, but it was sustained by recall of the MIS fiasco story. Developers' focus on shortterm ISD approaches stemmed in part from their self-interested fear of repeating that failure, and their feverish attempts to "get something out there" resulted from their desire to maintain credibility with Brady and other sales managers, after the long RD process. When Tony Foley and Mary Kelly joined BIS, their expectations about short-term development approaches added to the salience of this domain (and displaced the Ideas consultants' assumptions related to strategic business value of IT). When the salience of IT delivery strategies increased, developers' interpretation of requirements reverted to previous, more conservative definitions, as developers directed their attention toward how to deliver requirements rapidly, rather than what requirements to deliver. The heightened salience of IT delivery strategies did at times engender new requirements, such as the quick hits involving notebook computer distribution (Episodes 4a and 8) and client-server networking (end of Episode 6). However, the requirements which the developers articulated in these instances had less to do with Brady's expectations for business value of IT than with their own ideas for facilitating IT delivery. In these situations, assumptions about IT delivery strategies and IT capabilities and design were mutually reinforcing; for example, the expectation that p!ug-and-play client server software could be used to build the BIS application infrastructure in staged, short-term, focused projects. Figure 2 illustrates shifting frame salience from Episodes 3 through 6 of the BIS project. Broader definitions of the BIS project arose when business value of IT was highly salient, but a narrow definition of BIS reemerged when developers focused on IT delivery strategy, after initial consideration of more radical project definitions. These reoccurring salience shifts inhibited ISD participants' ability to reach and maintain provisional agreements about requirements.
Since system constituents were not active participants during most of the BIS project, developers' frames were de facto dominant vis-avis constituents' frames in influencing how requirements were legitimized for the project. System constituents were nonetheless influenced by the framing process, with individual constituents' understanding of the project becoming fixed at the point in time when they had been actively involved in RD activities. Some sales representatives and managers continued to view BIS as an MSIS replacement, after participating in interviews and project reviews (Episodes 1 and 4b), whereas sales staff involved in the pilot project of Episode 4a understood BIS as providing selling tools to the sales force. None of those interviewed shared Brady's ideas for radically changing sales through IT use, however.
We now consider how understanding frames and framing in RD informs our understanding of the exercise of power In iSD, as weil as its iimitations. Power in ISD is manifest not only through authority structures and overt control over resources but also by influence on how others interpret their world and thus how they chose to act, based on their interpretations (Markus and Bjorn-Anderson 1987) . The exercise of interpretive power was evident in this case, most dramatically in the influence of Executive VP Sam Brady. As a high-ranking executive at GHl, Brady wielded not only the authority to direct others' actions, but his frames influenced how others made sense of contextual information and interpreted BIS requirements. Brady contributed radically different ideas through stories, metaphors, and scenarios-of-use. His frames dominated the project discourse, albeit sporadically, influencing what types of requirements developers considered legitimate, particularly early in Episodes 2, 5, and 6, as they adopted his assumptions about business vaiue of IT.
Even though he had the authority to intervene in RD activities, and did so on several occasions, Brady's interpretive power to shape requirements definition in a lasting way was limited by the resurgence of developers' assumptions about iT deiivery strategies, which pointed them toward more conservative definitions of requirements than Brady envisioned. Brady could inspire developers to think broadly about business vaiue of iT, but he could not overcome their selfinterested focus on short-term delivery strategies; his acceptance in Episode 6 of their modest proposal was an acknowledgement of this limitation. Brady's interpretive power over RD was also constrained by his inability to effectively influence the frames of his fellow executives at GHl. No opportunity presented itself to observe Brady at work with other GHl executives, but his own assessment, in an interview held after the GHl reorganization (Episode 7), suggested that he had little success influencing them. Brady characterized his efforts as "trying to push a marble up a mountain with your nose." He commented that there had been only intellectual agreement on the need for the BIS project, but no "visceral attachment" to it. While Brady acted as project champion, his frames, backed by his organizational authority, guided other ISD participants' interpretations of BIS. But Brady's frames truly represented an individual-level influence, not the shared frames of GHl executives. His interpretive power depended on his active participation in the project. WhenBradychangedjobswithinGHl,his visions and his frames went with him, leaving little lasting influence on others' frames and on their subsequent interpretations of project requirements.
Implications for Research
This paper builds on the concept of technology frames to develop a socio-cognitive process model for framing during requirements determination and suggests an analytic approach for investigating instability in RD that focuses on shifts in frame salience. The project examined highlights the potential tension between grand visions of the transformative potential of information technologies and pragmatic knowledge about the risks of undertaking large-scale, complex ISD projects. This does not suggest that either frame is preferable to the other, or that some shifting between these frames could not be beneficial during ISD; it was repeated shifts between the business vaiue of IT and iT deiivery strategies frames that inhibited ISD participants' attempts to reach and maintain provisional agreements about requirements. Additional studies may identify frame shifting patterns that are beneficial in ISD. For instance, studies of the appropriation and transformation of information technologies through practice (Orlikowski 1996; Orlikowski and Hofman 1997; Orlikowski et. al. 1995) suggest that iT-enabied work practices and iT capabiiities and design frames become highly salient after initial implementation and may synergistically facilitate appropriation of an IT into work routines.
As a process theory, framing offers insights not available through variance theories (Markus and Robey 1988; Newman and Robey 1992) . The model draws analytic attention to the dynamics and possible consequences of frame shifts, suggesting a theoretical perspective on questions of persistence and change in patterns of social action (Robey and Newman 1996) , If frames are overly sensitive to change triggers, shifting frame salience may preclude persistence of project definitions and disrupt RD activities. On the other hand, overly rigid frames could hinder recognition of important cues, resulting in systems with limited business value. In this regard, further study of framing dynamics could enhance our understanding of escalation of commitment to ISD projects (Keil and Robey 1999; Newman and Sabherwal 1996) . The technology frames concept helps explain why key stakeholders in ISD selectively seek or filter contextual information consistent with existing frames. What Keil and Robey (1999) term the deaf ear effect of managers ignoring negative information about a troubled project may reflect the socio-cognitive filtering of contextual cues that are inconsistent with an existing frame. Furthermore, the framing model suggests that excessive stability (or fluidity) in framing may contribute to unwarranted escalation (or de-escalation) of commitment in the face of contradictory contextual cues, such as changes in the business environment or leadership during a long project. Additional studies will be needed to identify circumstances that contribute to fluidity/rigidity, to further assess the implications for stability in requirements determination, and to determine if there are beneficial levels of frame shifting, such that an ISD project is open to relevant contextual cues but not disrupted by them.
The socio-cognitive perspective on ISD adopted in this paper complements analyses of power in ISD (Brown 1998; Hirschheim and Klein 1989; Markus 1983; Newman and Nobel 1990; Sillince and Mouakket 1997) , The framing model assumes the possibility of dominant frames arising in RD activities through participation of influential individuals or groups. Interpretive power is brought to bear when dominant frames form the basis from which others develop their understanding of requirements. However, the case analyzed here also points out that interpretive power in RD may be ephemeral, constrained by the resiliency of others' frames and dependent on the active involvement of dominant individuals or groups during ISD activities, to maintain the dominance of their interpretive focus. Actor-network theory concepts may further inform the analysis of interpretive power in framing to provide a sense of power, direction, and causality, directing aftention to how various interest groups enlist others in their technology frames and thus build lasting support for their own interpretation (Lea et al. 1995; Lin and Cornford 2000) .
The methodological approach used here focused on ISD participants' use of metaphors and stories as symbols of tacit assumptions and expectations characteristic of their frames. It became evident during the analysis that these sensemaking devices play a critical role in individuals' sensemaking and communication in RD activities. This finding supports research on the cognitive influence of metaphors and illustrates the important role that sensemaking devices play in communication and knowledge sharing in ISD (Boland and Greenberg 1992; Davidson 1999; Lanzara 1983; Mason 1991) , This discoursebased approach may be valuable in research to assess how technology frames become shared or diverge among key stakeholders before, during, and after ISD and to investigate the implications of IT discourse for organizational change (Heracleous and Barrett 2001) , This approach may also be useful to explore how industry-wide discourse on new information technologies, what Swanson and Ramiller (1997) term an organizing vision, may enter and influence the discourse within an organization and thus may help explain interorganizational diffusion of technology.
Implications for Practice
Managing requirements determination in organizations is one of the most difficult aspects of ISD. Participants (individuals or groups) may come or go, bringing new sets of knowledge, assumptions, and expectations into the project discourse, or leaving existing assumptions to fade away. Similarly, changes in participants' influence and authority may increase or decrease the influence their frames carry with other participants. Such events shift the interpretive basis on which participants make sense of their world and arrive at understandings of requirements, increasing the difficulty of reaching and maintaining agreements that enable systems building. Methodological approaches such as freezing requirements and rapid application development are ways in which practitioners have attempted to manage RD processes. If a development project can be highly focused, expedited, and completed in a short time frame, less contextually-cued turmoil in framing may occur. These methodological techniques are not always successful, however (Curtis et al. 1988) . Furthermore, these techniques cannot prevent events such as reorganizations or developments in the organization's external environment that can trigger shifts in frame salience. Even if frame shifting could be minimized by limiting ISD participants' attention to contextual changes, relevant information about requirements might also be filtered out, resulting in IT applications that have little support from key stakeholders or limited business value. A lesson of the BIS project is that IT implementers may not be able to avoid disruptive events during RD nor a dynamic framing process. Ideally, if shifts in frame salience are recognized and explicitly acknowledged, ISD participants may be better able to manage the influence of shifts on RD processes and outcomes.
The four frame domains identified here provide a starting point for identifying the categories of knowledge, assumptions, and expectations salient in RD activities, to examine their influence on how requirements are articulated and legitimated, and to monitor shifts in frame salience. The BIS project highlighted potential tension between two frame domains: IT delivery strategies and business value of IT. Both domains represent critical assumptions about the application of IT in organizations. However, these assumptions may be in conflict, for example, if executives' expectations for far-reaching and innovative uses of IT conflict with IT developers' assumptions about limiting ISD risk through short-term, small-scale projects, as they did here. Surfacing ISD participants' concerns about sanctions for failure may be necessary to reconcile such apparent incongruence, so that compromises in project definition are possible.
Notably in the BIS project, the IT-enabled work practices frame was not highly salient in the requirements discourse in the BIS project. Instead, frames related to the how {IT delivery strategies), what {IT capabilities and design), and why {business value of IT) of requirements overshadowed assumptions about IT~enabled work practice, particularly among developers, Sociotechnical researchers have for some time cautioned about the lack of attention during design to an IT application's fit with day-to-day practices. Seeking ways to increase the salience of IT-enabled work practices during RD activities and to stimulate framing through activities such as trial use or pilot programs may help users and developers to become aware of their assumptions about how a technology fits with work practices, whether it is likely to be used as anticipated, and what support will be required to successfully transition it into use.
Analysis of the BIS case illustrates how requirements are socially constructed through ongoing discourse, much of it oral interactions liberally sprinkled with illustrative stories and metaphors. These sensemaking devices help ISD participants explore possible requirements and influence their understanding of a project. However, as others have also noted (Walz et al. 1993) , informal sensemaking devices are often omitted from structured RD artifacts. Furthermore, key aspects of the oral discourse may be purposely omitted from written artifacts, despite their influence on how requirements are socially determined, as the MIS fiasco story was from BIS documents. These omissions reduce the value of RD documents as a method of communicating relevant assumptions on which requirements definitions are based and may be an indication of underlying issues with a project's definition.
Conclusion
The messy, nonlinear nature of requirements determination is well known to practitioners and IS researchers alike. Understanding why RD is so difficult in organizations, and developing ways to improve the process and outcomes of RD activities is an ongoing challenge to both groups. This paper suggests that improving our understanding of socio-cognitive processes in RD is one approach for doing so. It is hoped that this research, though its focus on the role of technology frames in sensemaking in RD and its articulation of the framing model, enriches our theoretical understanding of ISD in organizations and increases our appreciation of the challenges practitioners face as they tackle this complex organizational undertaking. my ability to see things from my informants' perspective. Although I maintained sensitivity to their multiple perspectives, the analysis presented here is my own construction, which reflects my theoretical interest in technology frames and the evolution of my thinking about these matters. No attempts have been made to overreach the limitations of the research method. For example, no claims are made that this case represents an organizational population.
To address the second question, I draw on Klein and Meyer's (1999) seven principles for interpretive field studies (indicated in italics). First, I examined technology frame in context, and in analysis and presentation, provided contextual information to situate the study in its historical setting. Second, I explicitly recognized interaction with study subjects and its infiuence on interpretation, as well the effects ofthe researcher's privileged perspective. Third, I provided meaningful abstraction and generalization Irom contextual details by drawing on the concept of technology frames, defining framing as a socio-cognitive process model, and identifying frame shifting patterns. Fourth, I employed dialogical reasoning to confront contradictions between my preconception of technology frames as stable and unchanging and my observation of the dynamic, shifting nature of frame salience in ISD processes. Fifth, I examined multiple interpretations of project requirements among ISD participants in my analysis. Furthermore, I acknowledged that the socio-cognitive perspective employed in this paper complements, rather than replaces, other approaches, such as studies of power in ISD. With respect to Klein and Meyer's principle of suspicion, 1 remained sensitive to possible biases and distortions in informants'accounts. Finally, this analysis is not explicitly a hermeneutic interpretation of the case study; however, by examining technology frames first in terms of their parts (i.e., domains), then integrating this analysis into the whole (framing processes), a more complete understanding of socio-cognitive processes in requirements determination resulted.
To answer the third question, I draw on Golden-Biddle and Locke's (1993) three dimensions for appealing ethnographic texts. First, to establish authenticity. I detailed my preconceptions, interactions with study subjects, and data collection and analysis methods. To create plausibility in the readers, I linked the case analysis to the established literature on social cognition and technology frames as a basis for the requirements framing model. Criticality is the most difficult dimension to achieve. This socio-cognitive analysis should give readers who understand requirements determination as a rational, orderly series of tasks in ISD a deeper perspective on this process. For those who view ISD primarily in terms of power or politics this analysis provides insights on the interpretive basis and limitations of power in ISD.
